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CHAPTER 4 
TAMPA BAY WATER WARS: FROM CONFLICT TO COLLABORATION? 
AYŞIN DEDEKORKUT 
 
The “water wars” in the Tampa Bay region between the governments of Pasco, Pinellas, and 
Hillsborough Counties and the cities of St. Petersburg, Tampa, and New Port Richey began in 
the early 1970s when densely populated but water-poor Pinellas County started buying land and 
developing drinking-water wellfields in Pasco and Hillsborough Counties (Figure 4-1). 
Groundwater pumping in the Tampa Bay region increased 400 percent between 1960 and 1996, 
and currently over 20 billion gallons of water is exported from Pasco County to Pinellas County 
every year (Glennon 2002). Pasco and Hillsborough Counties were not happy with the 
southbound flow of the water. The impact of the wells on lakes and wetlands, including damage 
to local residents’ homes, prompted countless legal challenges, but courts and the legislature 
supported the claims of Pinellas County and the city of St. Petersburg. This chapter analyzes two 
attempts to create institutions to resolve the conflict, one that failed and the current one that 
holds some promise. We present the history in some detail to demonstrate the complexity of 
resolving conflicts, and then consider lessons for adaptive governance. 
 
[insert Figure 4-1 about here] 
 
A Brief History of the Tampa Bay Conflict 
The First Regional Authority  
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In October 1974, West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority (West Coast) was created by the 
Florida legislature “in response to concerns over negative environmental impacts associated with 
uncoordinated development of, and competition for, the Tampa Bay region’s fresh water 
sources” (Meinhart 1989). West Coast existed by contract among voting members including 
Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Pasco countries, and the cities of St. Petersburg and Tampa. The city 
of New Port Richey had a seat but no vote. West Coast’s board was made up of elected officials 
or designated representatives from each local government; they agreed to buy water from West 
Coast, which in turn bought and developed the well fields. The Southwest Florida Water 
Management District (SWFWMD) and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
(FDEP) were involved as regulating and permitting agencies (see Chapter 2). 
 
Initial Success: Developing a Regional Water Supply Plan  
Plans for joint development of future water supplies for the region were constantly hampered by 
parochial attitudes of West Coast members. Pinellas continued buying well fields in Pasco and 
held its participation in the $125 million Cypress Bridge well field hostage to pressure the other 
parties in other issues. Neither that project nor West Coast could continue without Pinellas. 
During discussions of common ownership of all facilities and a single water rate for all member 
governments to replace the different rates based on the facilities owned, Pasco County resisted 
giving up the first right to water from its wells. Guarantees that were satisfactory to Pasco 
County were not acceptable to Pinellas County. After months of negotiations, in July 1991 they 
signed an agreement that gave Pasco control of development of wells in most of the county, but 
allowed Pinellas to build new wells in two fields without Pasco’s permission. This historic 
agreement was seen as the beginning of true regional cooperation and the end of the water wars.  
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Recurrent Conflict: Limiting Groundwater Extraction 
Unfortunately, neither West Coast nor the 1991 agreement resolved the underlying conflict over 
claims that overpumping was damaging property and habitat close to well fields. For a long time, 
both West Coast and the permitting authority, SWFWMD, claimed that drought, not pumping, 
was responsible for declining water levels. But more citizens complained about the 
environmental impacts of groundwater pumping through letters, phone calls, and personal 
appearances in front of the SWFWMD Governing Board (Glennon 2002). In response to 
escalating complaints, early in 1993 SWFWMD developed new regulations to curb saltwater 
intrusion into groundwater sources and denied a construction permit that effectively put on hold 
several parts of the critical Cypress Bridge project. In 1994 the board asked the staff to determine 
the “minimum amount of water needed for health and safety” (Rand 2000) in order to formalize 
the new policy recognizing the problem of overpumping.  
The ensuing SWFWMD actions suggest that Florida’s water management districts 
recognize a responsibility to resolve such disputes, but their ability to do so remains under 
challenge. West Coast and SWFWMD pushed for conservation as an alternative to new supply 
development, but area governments continued their longstanding resistance to restricting access 
to groundwater. Pinellas County leaders in particular worried that water restrictions would kill 
growth and the economy (Garcia 1993; Garcia and Rogers 1993). SWFWMD then proposed 
“Water Shortage Orders” to force local governments to take specific actions to reduce water 
demand (Rand 2000). When West Coast, Pinellas County, and St. Petersburg immediately filed 
suit against two proposed orders, SWFWMD changed tactics and issued Emergency Order 94-12 
in June 1994 to West Coast and its members to reduce groundwater withdrawals, claiming that 
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pumping from well fields had drained lakes and wetlands, killed wildlife, and ruined 
homeowners’ wells. Unlike the Water Shortage Order, an Emergency Order takes effect 
immediately until a court overturns it. Thus the consequences could be felt immediately to the 
extent that the concurrency requirements of the 1985 State Growth Management Act prohibit the 
approval of any new development until adequate public facilities, including potable water, are in 
place (Planning 1995). In September 1994, West Coast sued SWFWMD to rescind the 
Emergency Order. 
These actions triggered the most intensive battles of the water wars: West Coast, its 
member governments, and SWFWMD spent more than $10 million on legal disputes between 
1994 and 1998.  
 
By March of 1994, every local government and even some of the 
activists retained counsel and prepared for war. There were in-
house lawyers, outside counsel, general counsel and experts on all 
sides—all paid for with public dollars…[Residents] were paying 
for at least six lawyers on all sides of the case. (Rand 2000) 
[Emphasis added] 
 
The immediate threat to development and the ensuing legal battles stimulated political  
intervention. In October 1994 Governor Lawton Chiles formed the Tampa Bay Water 
Coordinating Council, bringing together SWFWMD and local government leaders to seek a 
consensus on how to develop and equitably distribute Tampa Bay’s water supply to meet 
existing and future demand while protecting water and associated environmental resources. The 
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Council issued a draft report in early 1995 which recognized the need for new partnerships to 
resolve differences among the many affected jurisdictions and interests (Jones 1996a).  
A truce brokered by Senator Jack Latvala (representative of north Pinellas and west 
Pasco Counties) led to agreement in July 1995 on a 35-year regional water supply plan as well as 
a withdrawal of the Emergency Order and subsequent litigation. The plan included more surface 
water, recycled water, and conservation to reduce use of groundwater. The direct participation of 
Tampa Mayor Dick Greco and St. Petersburg Mayor David Fischer, along with the absence of 
Pinellas County Commissioner Charles Rainey (for health reasons), were critical in producing a 
4-0 vote in West Coast strongly backing the new plan.  
The Coalition of Lake Associations (COLA), representing more than 3,000 property 
owners in Pasco, Hernando, and Hillsborough Counties, prepared a class-action lawsuit in 
December 1995 to reduce overpumping and recoup monetary damages from West Coast, 
Pinellas County, and St. Petersburg as well field operators. The following month, Pinellas 
County filed a preemptive lawsuit against COLA, SWFWMD, and eight citizens. Pinellas’ 
lawsuit was interpreted as a “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation” (SLAPP) by those 
who claimed Pinellas sought to use judicial process to intimidate citizens, stifle legitimate public 
debate, and silence the opposition (Duckworth 1996). To counter SWFWMD’s claim of long-
term water shortages (backed by a $2.7 million dollar public relations department), Pinellas 
increased funding for its public awareness campaign from the originally budgeted $300,000 to 
$800,000 to convince citizens that the environmental impacts on the lakes and wetlands were due 
to drought, not overpumping (Seaton and Thalji 1996).  
The debate of liability was reduced to the interpretation of the word “overpumped”, with 
West Coast, Pinellas, and St. Petersburg defining the term as exceeding permitted quantities, 
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while SWFWMD—which admitted having “overpermitted” (Olinger 1994)—interpreting 
“overpumping” to mean “too much water being taken from the ground” (Rand 2000). The 
determination one way or another was critical because of its very different policy implications as 
well as establishment of liability to pay for the damage and the new supplies.  
From a strictly legal standpoint Pinellas’ suit was not SLAPP, but some claimed it had 
the same effect of discouraging public participation (Rand 2000). A published apology in 1999 
and the $341,600 settlement for the activists that hadn’t settled before might be considered a 
small victory for the citizens. However, controversy over how to deal with the issue caused the 
resignation of some COLA board members, and the pressure of the lawsuit resulted in the 
eventual disbanding of the coalition. These results illustrate the difficulty that affected groups 
can face when they try to participate in the judicial arena.  
In January 1996 the Pinellas County Commission, West Coast, and SWFWMD attempted 
a joint scientific expert review with the assistance of the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium 
to “resolve the scientific issues in dispute involved in the planning and regulatory activities used 
by SWFWMD to meet the District’s responsibility in allocating water withdrawals” (Jones 
1996b). A joint panel of scientific experts responded to a list of questions with a report, but it 
produced no direct actions to resolve how much water each permit-holder could pump. 
An administrative hearing prompted by SWFWMD’s Emergency Order for four well 
field permits was scheduled for late July 1996. St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, and West Coast 
challenged the permits that required pumping to stop if surface water or the aquifer drop below 
certain levels. One week before the hearing, SWFWMD dropped environment-related conditions 
from the permit renewal applications, but then denied permit applications because the applicants 
failed to prove pumping would not harm the environment. This shifted the burden of proof about 
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acceptable levels of pumping from SWFWMD to the applicants. The conflict became so intense 
that Pasco and Hillsborough appeared ready to pull out of West Coast (Pilla 1996). The hearing 
issued a Recommended Order directing SWFWMD to renew the permits for the well fields, but a 
final decision was repeatedly delayed to allow SWFWMD and West Coast to negotiate a deal 
that would end the controversy.  
 
Legislative Intervention 
During the ongoing dispute, Pasco County leaders and others had appealed to the legislature for 
help in reforming state water policy. In response, the Florida Senate and House of 
Representatives set up select committees to hold hearings under Senator Latvala and 
Representative R. Z. Safley. The resultant Water Resources Act was signed in May 1996 after 
many controversial proposals, including “local sources first” pushed by Pasco activists, were 
discarded. Most critically, the bill imposed a deadline of October 1997 for SWFWMD to set 
minimum water levels for lakes, wetlands, and aquifers in priority areas in Pasco, Hillsborough, 
and Pinellas, and to undertake studies to determine the relative impact of pumping versus 
drought on water levels. Furthermore, West Coast was directed to consider a series of reforms 
and report its findings to the legislature the following February.  
The deadlines were critical incentives to resolve the disputes. Worried that if they did not 
do something on their own the legislature would impose a solution, West Coast officials 
approved a restructuring in December 1996 which would turn West Coast into a true utility. All 
members would pay the same wholesale rate for water and share the costs of developing new 
water sources. This would enable them to develop alternative sources such as a desalination 
plant. Member governments would turn over their well fields to West Coast and the board would 
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be expanded from five members to nine, three from each county. Making the city of New Port 
Richey a voting member would increase Pasco County’s representation from 20 to 33 percent. 
All would be elected officials, and a majority would rule. By January 1997, all parties approved 
the regional Water Supply Plan that included the reorganization of West Coast.  
The legislature’s October 1 deadline to SWFWMD to set minimum levels and flows put 
pressure on the negotiations. The toughest issue was Tampa’s reluctance to give up its 
independence from West Coast. Among various special exemptions, Tampa requested unlimited 
ability to develop new water resources on its own from the Hillsborough River and to continue to 
own and operate the Tampa Bypass Canal. Pinellas, on the other hand, wanted to control the 
quality of its water, particularly a veto on the reuse of recovered wastewater. The negotiations 
dragged on until October, but finally resolved these issues.  
Monetary incentives were also critical for achieving a settlement. In March 1997, 
SWFWMD offered West Coast $325 million over 10 years from the District’s New Water 
Sources Initiative funding to help develop new water supplies. In exchange, West Coast would 
reduce groundwater pumping to the specified levels and not challenge SWFWMD’s 
environmental protection decisions. This enabled SWFWMD to set minimum flow and level 
(MFL) rules on September 9, fulfilling its obligation to the state legislature.  
After two years of intensive negotiation, all the pieces were in place to resolve the 
overpumping issue. West Coast’s board approved the restructuring plan in March 1998. 
SWFWMD approved the Northern Tampa Bay New Water Supply and Ground Water 
Withdrawal Reduction Agreement (the Partnership Agreement) in May 1998. Each member 
government waived its right to individually develop water supplies and transferred its facilities to 
the newly formed Tampa Bay Water on October 1, 1998 (Tampa Bay Water n.d.). 
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Tampa Bay Water 
Since its inception, Tampa Bay Water has demonstrated an ability to resolve conflicts in a 
manner that at least allows progress in building and maintaining infrastructure necessary to 
mitigate environmental damages while fulfilling water supply obligations to member 
governments. Conflicts inevitably arise over the location, timing, and nature of individual 
projects, and meeting the pumping reduction requirements of the Partnership Agreement presents 
significant challenges to the Authority (Glennon 2002).  
For example, the development of a saltwater desalination plant in southern Hillsborough 
County is vital to Tampa Bay Water’s plan to meet the required reductions for pumping 
groundwater. However, the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program and citizens expressed 
concern that reducing the amount of fresh water that reached Tampa Bay with the new reservoir 
project, combined with the discharge of brine from the desalination plant, would dangerously 
increase salinity in the bay. In November 1999 Save Our Bays and Canals (SOBAC) formed to 
oppose the desalination plant. They challenged the proposed FDEP permit in order to make the 
plant dispose of the effluent in another way, such as piping it into deeper waters and installing 
equipment to raise dissolved oxygen levels in the discharge (Brookes 2001). Mediation sessions 
failed to resolve the differences and the case went to hearing at FDEP (Swichtenberg 2001). The 
administrative law judge rejected SOBAC’s challenge in October 2001 (Tampa Bay Water 2001) 
and the desalination plant started operation on March 16, 2003 (Tampa Bay Soundings 2003). 
However, the impacts on the environment are still uncertain since the plant has been mostly 
inactive since February 2004 due to efficiency problems and will not operate until late 2006 
when the repairs will be completed (Membrane and Separation Technology News 2005). 
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Lessons for Adaptive Governance 
Representation 
Although not directly involved in the Tampa Bay disputes, elected state officials oversaw 
regional problems. The legislature and governor both provided alternative institutions for 
resolving the Tampa Bay disputes. In response to escalating litigation among local governments 
and regulatory authorities, the Florida State legislature was instrumental in the creation of West 
Coast Regional Water Supply Authority and later in its transformation into Tampa Bay Water. 
Governor Lawton Chiles formed the Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council in October 1994.  
Local elected and appointed officials initially reflected the traditional interests of their 
constituency, so the change from adversarial to collaborative methods in part reflected changing 
personalities and career incentives. Charles Rainey, Pinellas County Commissioner for over 30 
years and West Coast board member from its creation in 1974 to 1996, represented the old guard. 
“The Pinellas County commissioner virtually founded the authority and acts as if he owns it” 
(Editorial 1995c). Rainey has been accused of being mostly responsible “for creating such a 
hostile environment in which compromise and conciliation are not even 
discussed…confrontational…parochial and litigious approach” (Editorial 1995d) and for using 
courts instead of other means.  
When the winds started to change, Rainey retired two years before the end of his term. 
“Rainey, who dominated West Coast from its start, staunchly opposed efforts to reduce 
dependence on well fields or develop alternative water sources, such as desalination. When 
Rainey left office and West Coast, momentum for a compromise quickly began to build” 
 11 
(Editorial 1998). Rainey was replaced by Steve Seibert, the only Pinellas Commissioner who had 
opposed the 1996 SLAPP lawsuit.  
The restructuring of West Coast and the Partnership Agreement came only after some of 
the key people who had carved out strong positions left or changed tactics. West Coast General 
Counsel Ed de la Parte’s legal firm had represented West Coast over 20 years, earning over $6 
million (Friedman 1994). With the revelation in 1993 that West Coast had the third-highest legal 
bills in all of state government de la Parte resigned as general counsel, but his status as “West 
Coast’s de facto chief policymaker” did not change because he immediately started representing 
Pinellas County (Friedman 1994).  
Mark Farrell and Pete Hubbell, two top executives of SWFWMD involved in the early 
conflict, also left. The new director, Sonny Vergara, had ten years of water supply experience, a 
fact appreciated by the West Coast board. Another new voice was the mayor of St. Petersburg, 
David Fischer, who replaced one of his city councilmen in the West Coast board and favored the 
formation of a true regional water utility. First-term State Senator Jack Latvala, whose 
constituency spanned the two major combatant counties, mediated the dispute between Pinellas 
County and SWFWMD over the Emergency Order (Moncada 1995b; Editorial 1995a) and 
played a major role in getting legislative approval for reorganization of West Coast and 
developing new water supplies.  
 
Design of Decision Processes 
Jones (1996a) emphasizes a fundamental structural water supply problem “in that most water 
issues are regional in nature, while most water suppliers are local”. The regional water 
management districts have regional authority, but the transformation from their original mission 
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of flood control to the water resource protection authority provided in 1973 took considerable 
time, particularly since existing long-term groundwater permits did not account for 
environmental quality impacts. Furthermore, SWFWMD’s permitting authority provided no 
means of developing alternative sources of water. Nor did courts provide an effective venue for 
resolving the conflict:  
 
 Judicial rulings produced mixed results, recognizing the 
connection between groundwater withdrawals and environmental 
damage, but not supporting pumping reductions because of the fear 
of possible consequences resulting from public supply reductions 
in the absence of any new sources coming on line. (SWFWMD 
2001)  
 
West Coast showed promise of finding a regional solution, but its five voting member 
structure gave Pasco only one vote while Pinellas had two, so Pinellas and St. Petersburg 
maintained control. Tampa often sided with Pinellas, voting to pump more water from Pasco and 
Hillsborough; Tampa was generally unaffected, and Pinellas and St. Petersburg’s positions made 
engineering sense to the staff engineer representing Tampa (Rand 2000). Furthermore, local 
governments could refuse to participate in funding (Rand 2000); Pinellas County regularly 
refused to pay for alternative source development, which essentially blocked sources other than 
groundwater because other jurisdictions could not fund these projects themselves.  
Compared to West Coast, Tampa Bay Water has the authority, control, and funding to 
meet its responsibility of providing water in the most cost-effective and environmentally 
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sensitive way possible (Rand 2000).Tampa Bay Water’s board provides more balanced 
representation among regional entities. The nine-member board of directors includes two elected 
representatives from each member county and one from each city. Of equal importance, Tampa 
Bay Water has developed a binding arbitration process for counties that disagree with a project. 
After the arbitration in May 2001 over the new reservoir in Hillsborough County, Tampa Bay 
Water manager Jerry Maxwell stated that alternative dispute resolution shortened the time to 
about a third, lowered the cost, and led to a reasonable solution (Heller 2001). The arbitration 
panel ordered the utility to give assurances that chemically treated water seeping from the 
reservoir would not damage septic systems or local wetlands.  
Despite the structural advantages over the previous authority, Tampa Bay Water has had 
its share of problems, particularly in terms of institutional memory loss that follow shifts in 
personnel. In particular, only two holdovers from the founding group took part in the 1998 Water 
Supply Plan discussion. No new leader emerged to fill the role of former Hillsborough County 
Commissioner Ed Turanchik, the chair of West Coast during the restructuring, and former 
Pinellas Commissioner Steve Seibert. The inexperience of new board members in working 
together, their lack of information about the water problems and alternative solutions, and the 
reemergence of parochial interests all combined to slow progress in developing the plan.  
 
Scientific Learning 
Scientific uncertainty played an important role in Tampa Bay’s water wars, particularly in 
assessing whether groundwater pumping limits were necessary. Throughout the 1980s 
SWFWMD agreed with West Coast that drought was causing the environmental problems, but a 
seven-year Water Resources Assessment study started in 1987 demonstrated that the cause of 
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environmental problems in wetlands and lakes of western Hillsborough and central Pasco 
Counties was not lack of rainfall, but well field pumping. Rand (2000) sees this as a major 
reversal of policy for SWFWMD. However, convincing the local governments to restrict 
pumping took considerably longer. Scientific uncertainty remains a source of contention, most 
recently over the effects of the water desalination plants and of changes in salinity on the bay.  
 
Public Learning  
The media was interested in the conflict throughout its long history, and lent support to the 
claims of Pasco and Hillsborough Counties and citizens about the impact of pumping on property 
owners and habitats. Rand (2000) notes that during May and June 1994, which she describes as 
the height of water wars, the Tampa Tribune and St. Petersburg Times published at least 183 
articles on the issue. The Times especially pressured both SWFWMD and West Coast to protect 
the water resources. After changing their position on whether drought or overpumping was 
causing environmental damage, SWFWMD had the media and the activists on its side and 
reportedly had 80 percent support (Rand 2000). Pinellas County’s decision to invest in public 
relations in 1995 was an acknowledgement that SWFWMD’s campaign was working and 
Pinellas had to respond in kind.  
Throughout Tampa Bay’s water wars, facilitative approaches were used several times. 
The Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council in 1994 and the joint scientific expert review in 
1996 each produced a report, but the reports were not linked either to public education or to 
subsequent decisions. However, a facilitator helped the West Coast board reach a consensus 
during the restructuring negotiations. Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium Director Robert 
Jones (2003) claims that although none of these efforts solved the problem by itself, each 
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contributed to the resolution through learning not just about the scientific bases of policy, but 
also about the alternatives and the costliness of the conflict. Perhaps the heavy costs in litigation 
and stalled investments provided the strongest incentive for creating Tampa Bay Water: a prime 
example of the “hurtful stalemates” that sometimes induce adaptive governance.  
 
Problem Responsiveness  
Tampa Bay water conflict illustrates the consequences of privatizing a common property 
resource and the difficulty of negotiating a shift from this system to a jointly managed property 
rights system. Groundwater has been included in ownership of overlying land under eastern 
water law, giving the landowner exclusive rights to its use. In the mid-twentieth century, owners’ 
rights in Florida were limited by permit requirements (see Chapter 2). This system of rights was 
difficult to reform, although changes in permits eventually forced the institutional changes 
required to develop infrastructure and sustainable use patterns.  
Inequity of amount and price of water between different local governments was 
historically a big problem. Under West Coast each government bought water at a different rate 
according to which facilities they owned; in some cases Pinellas County paid less for drinking 
water pumped from the other counties than did those counties. Pinellas County and the city of St. 
Petersburg systematically benefited from cheap imported water while damaging Pasco and 
Hillsborough Counties, which had no control over the water exported from their counties.  
Different stages of development contributed to the problem. Newly growing Pasco and 
Hillsborough Counties were water donors while old growth Pinellas was an importer. Pasco and 
Hillsborough opposed most of the new projects within their borders and proposed a brackish 
water treatment plant in Pinellas County so Pinellas would contribute its share to the water 
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supply. Pinellas objected to conservation efforts and sources other than groundwater because 
groundwater was much cheaper, and cheap water was important to sustain growth. Especially 
throughout 1970s and 1980s, the growth proponents, including developers and builders, 
dominated Pinellas County. In a St. Petersburg Times article Friedman (1994) claims that  
 
There’s no money to be made in conservation…But there is big 
money to be made from the construction and technology needed to 
tap new water sources. And of course, nobody makes more money 
than the developers who depend on water to lubricate continued 
growth up and down Tampa Bay. 
 
Others expressed similar sentiments about Pinellas and St. Petersburg’s resistance to 
change. “That’s why they have spent millions of tax dollars fighting to keep on pumping. For 
money. Not for water” (Clarke 1996). “This isn’t about water, it’s about money. It’s about 
development, and the engine that drives development is water” (Barry 1996).  
Initially it seemed cheaper to litigate, but courts never efficiently resolved 
disputes in the water wars. Major projects to improve the water supply infrastructure 
were held up. Clearly, the court system imposed very high transaction costs before a 
negotiated restructuring and regional planning ended the era of unlimited groundwater, 
the unequal rate structure, and rejection of alternatives to groundwater. 
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Conclusions 
This study of the Tampa Bay water wars highlights several key factors that were instrumental in 
sustaining, and then ending, the conflict.  
Lack of binding authority: Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council is regarded as a 
failure due to lack of binding authority, which enabled Pinellas County to withdraw its support 
when things did not go as they wished. Jones (1996a) argues that many of the recommendations 
from the Council’s report have been incorporated in subsequent plans and agreements, but the 
Council did not change the local governments’ handling of water supply in any fundamental and 
immediate way. Decisionmaking by unanimous vote resulted in lack of binding authority; West 
Coast failed to settle the water wars because a single member government could kill a project. 
Reluctance to give up existing advantages and independence from other local 
governments: Pasco’s insistence on control of its groundwater, Tampa’s reliance on the 
Hillsborough River for its water supply rather than groundwater supplied by West Coast, and 
resulting independence from the other governments obstructed negotiations for restructuring 
West Coast into Tampa Bay Water. 
Nature of representation on the West Coast board: The presence of Tampa Mayor Dick 
Greco and St. Petersburg Mayor David Fischer on the West Coast board, instead of subordinates, 
contributed to agreement on the 35-year regional water supply plan. Tampa’s representation by a 
non-elected official had created conflict, especially when Tampa voted together with Pinellas 
and St. Petersburg.  
Loss of institutional memory: Key people who had negotiated the restructuring and the 
Partnership Agreement left the board. With only two holdovers from the initial group in the 
Tampa Bay Water’s board, parochialism and talk of water wars reemerged during the discussions 
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of the 1998 Water Supply Plan. Pasco’s seat on the board changed hands five times within two 
and a half years of reorganization and interrupted continuity: “The revolving door at Tampa Bay 
Water is a legitimate concern because newer members, unfamiliar with the aggressive schedule 
for developing new water sources and reducing groundwater pumping in Pasco, often are 
accompanied by a ‘let’s-do-more study’ attitude that translates into little more than delays” 
(Editorial 2000).  
Threat of an imposed solution by the legislature: One factor that drove West Coast’s 
restructuring was members’ fear that if they did not do something on their own, the legislature 
would impose a solution. All agreed that “a solution of their design was better than one imposed 
from Tallahassee” (Rand 2000). 
Financial incentives: The development of alternative supplies was repeatedly thwarted 
because the local governments could not agree on how to share the cost until the proposal of the 
Partnership Agreement (The Economist 1998). 
Change of personalities: The change from the adversarial to a collaborative approach is 
attributed to a shift in personalities, especially on the West Coast board, from established 
officials with careers invested in their positions on water to younger, more conciliatory voices.  
Threat of a deadline: The approaching hearing date curtailed the dispute over 
SWFWMD’s 1994 Emergency Order to stop overpumping. Pressure to resolve the issue by 
October 1, 1997, the deadline set by the legislature to determine minimum flows, was again 
crucial in moving things along during the discussions to restructure West Coast. 
 
 
